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Abstract A criticism of consociational power sharing as an institutional response to violent conflict 
is that it buttresses rather than ameliorates the underlying (linguistic, religious or ethno-national) 
divide, hence prohibiting the emergence of new dimensions of political competition (such as economic 
left-right or moral liberal-conservative dimensions) that are characteristic of 'normal' societies. We 
test this argument in the context of the illustrative Northern Ireland case, using data from expert 
coding of party policy documents and opinion data derived from two Voter Advice Applications 
(VAAs). We find evidence for a moral liberal-conservative dimension of politics in addition to the 
ethno-national dimension. Hence, we caution against assuming that consociational polities are uni-
dimensional.  
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1. Introduction 
One response to violent conflict in deeply divided places is to implement consociational power 
sharing arrangements. Political parties from the opposing groups in society enter an inclusive 
coalition government, and each group is given a right of veto over important legislation that may 
adversely affect their particular community. There is quite a heated normative debate over the merits 
and demerits of the power sharing approach to conflict resolution.1 Proponents argue that it is a system 
that is most likely to generate a secure and peaceful polity in which all groups are included in decision 
making. Critics argue that because power sharing is based on recognising and giving veto rights to 
distinct rival social groups the institutional arrangements simply cement and prolong the underlying 
division in society. Accordingly, other possible political debates that are associated with 'normal' 
societies are prohibited from developing, leaving post conflict societies forever languishing in divide-
based politics.  
However, there are counter-arguments, suggesting that implementing consociational 
government may enable other dimensions to emerge. First, power sharing arrangements may 
incentivise movement by formerly violent parties in a moderate direction in order to gain votes and 
executive power in proportion to those votes. This may lead to within-bloc party similarity and a 
perceived need by parties to differentiate themselves on other policy dimensions.2 Second, arriving 
at a negotiated consociational settlement may signify acceptance of the legitimacy of the state by all 
major relevant actors, and acceptance of the legitimacy of the resulting power sharing government. 
This resulting government must make decisions on a range of policy themes, hence raising the 
salience of those non-divide issue dimensions.3  
                                                 
1
   Proponents of consociation include Lijphart (1969, 1977, 2004) and McGarry and O’Leary (2004) and 
opponents include Horowitz (1985, 2014). See a debate from a range of contributors in Taylor (2009). 
2 See discussion in Garry (2009) and on the general incentives to moderate see Tonge and Evans (2009, p. 1028). 
3 See Mitchell et al. (2009) on the implications for party competition of arriving at a consociational settlement and 
generating an inclusive power sharing government. 
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 Here, we focus on the illustrative case of post-2007 Northern Ireland as a fully functioning 
consociational power sharing polity and examine the dimensionality of policy space.4 Are the critics 
of consociation right in arguing that there is likely to be only one dimension of competition? 
Specifically, is the underlying ethno-national divide (between Protestant unionists who favour 
Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom (UK) and Catholic nationalists who favour a 
united Ireland) the only strong attitude dimension in citizens' minds and the only dimension driving 
party competition and vote choice? Or, do Northern Ireland citizens and parties adopt distinct 
positions on other dimensions of competition and is vote behaviour driven by these issue areas? 
Despite often being characterised politically as a land of ‘green’ versus ‘orange’ issues, a cursory 
following of post-2007 Northern Ireland current affairs suggests that economics and morality are core 
aspects of political debate. Welfare reform has divided the parties and has brought the political 
institutions to the brink of collapse. The issue of same-sex marriage has led to the resignation of a 
minister and much inter-party disagreement on an associated ‘conscience clause’ bill. Are these issues 
indicative of important underlying dimensions of competition on economic (left-right) and moral 
(liberal-conservative) matters? 
 We begin by elaborating our general expectations regarding policy dimensionality under 
Northern Ireland’s consociational conditions and specifying our research questions. We then describe 
our sources of data (expert coding that we conducted of party policy documents and opinion data 
from two Voter Advice Applications (VAAs) that we produced). We then report the extent to which 
non-ethno national attitude dimensions structure citizens’ attitudes and the extent to which the 
political parties offer distinct positions on these dimensions. Further, we examine whether citizens 
choose parties on the basis of non-ethno national dimensions. In theory, if the economic or moral 
dimensions were very politically salient for citizens and parties were different from each other on 
these dimensions, citizens might vote ‘across the divide’, with Catholics voting for one of the unionist 
                                                 
4  Northern Ireland is here used as an illustrative example of a post violent conflict consociational polity, and is 
particularly useful as a case given that Northern Ireland is often cited as a ‘model’ to follow for other places 
suffering violent ethnic conflict (Wilson, 2010).  
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parties (or Protestants voting for one of the nationalist parties). However, given the rarity of cross 
ethnic voting we examine the possible electoral importance of a non-ethno national dimension in two 
ways: does it predict within bloc voting (i.e. which particular nationalist party a Catholic votes for, or 
which particular unionist party a Protestant votes for) and does it predict outside bloc voting (do 
Catholics and Protestants who vote for the bi-communal Alliance party do so on the basis of 
ideological dimensions such as economics and morality)? 
 In short we find that – in addition to the underlying ethno-national dimension – a moral liberal-
conservative dimension is a strongly structured attitude dimension. Also, parties offer choice on this 
dimension and voters vote on the basis of it (in terms of within-bloc and outside-bloc voting).5 These 
findings caution against the assumption that consociational power sharing necessarily leads to a uni-
dimensional polity, and lend credence to the idea that other policy dimensions may also play a role. 
We elaborate the implications of our findings for our understanding of how consociation influences 
policy space and for normative debates on the desirability or otherwise of power sharing as an 
institutional response to violent conflict. 
 
2. Non-ethno national dimensions 
We investigate the extent to which dimensions of competition, such as economic left-right, liberal-
conservative and pro- versus anti-EU, which are salient in ‘mainland Britain’ (Heath et al., 1994; 
Evans et al., 1996), operate in Northern Ireland.6  
 
Economic left-right 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are the departure point for many scholars of political cleavages and policy 
dimensions. They identify a range of fundamental cleavages in European industrialised societies, 
                                                 
5  On the potential of future voting across the divide see Garry (2014). 
6  Northern Ireland is a consociational democracy with a powersharing executive and assembly elected via 
proportional representation. All five parties analysed – the DUP, Sinn Féin, UUP, SDLP and Alliance – were 
represented in the executive at the time of data collection. These parties are typically characterised in terms of their 
position on the ethno-national dimension stretching from very strong unionist (DUP), unionist (UUP), bi-communal 
(Alliance), nationalist (SDLP) and strongly nationalist (Sinn Féin) (see discussion in Mitchell et al. (2009)). 
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arguably the most influential of which is the economic ideological divide between Left and Right. 
This derived from the owner versus worker (or social class) cleavage, as more economically 
marginalized sectors of society attempted to secure a redistribution of wealth and influence from the 
privileged classes and saw the state as the instrument to accomplish this redistribution. This left-right 
divide is ubiquitous in the international study of policy dimensions and has long been seen as the core 
divide in British politics. In the Northern Ireland context some previous research has examined the 
economic left-right basis of citizens’ attitudes, party positions and vote choice.  For example the 
Gilland Lutz and Farrington (2006) study based on a 2003 survey of candidates and the Benoit and 
Laver (2006) study based on a 2003 expert survey paint a fairly similar picture of Northern Ireland 
party positions. On the economy, Sinn Féin (SF) is the most ‘left-wing’ and the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) the most ‘right-wing’, with the remaining three parties – the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), the (nationalist) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and (the cross-community) 
Alliance (All) – clustered around the centre-ground.  
In terms of citizens’ economic left-right attitudes and the relationship between these attitudes 
and vote choice, Evans and Duffy (1997) examined pooled 1989-1991 data from the Northern Ireland 
Social Attitudes survey (NISA). A left-right ideology measure was generated from five items which 
displayed a good level of internal consistency and was, among Protestants, a strong predictor of party 
preference (with the DUP associated with more left-wing voters). A study by Tilley et al. (2008) used 
pooled 1989-2004 data from NISA and the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey (NILTS) and 
found that economic left-right attitudes (using three items which form ‘a fairly internally coherent 
scale’) did not predict vote choice for either Protestants or Catholics. Similar findings were arrived at 
by Garry (2009). A further study by Tilley and Evans (2011), however, did find that economic left-
right (using a two item scale for 1989-2006 NISA/NILT data) predicted Protestant vote choice (again 
with the DUP linked with more left-wing voters). In short, the findings suggest a reasonably strong 
structure to citizens’ left-right attitudes but inconsistency regarding the relationship between this 
dimension and party preference.  
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However, it may be that, post-2007, economic attitudes more sharply delineate party positions 
and more strongly structure citizens’ attitudes and determine vote choice, given the degree of 
prominence afforded economic issues. Most notably, since 2012 the Northern Ireland Executive and 
Assembly have been clearly divided over the implementation of welfare reform measures introduced 
by the Westminster government. Sinn Féin has adopted a staunchly left-wing stance, refusing to 
implement cuts to social welfare allowances and vetoing the budget. The Executive parties, along 
with the British and Irish governments, have participated in several high-profile initiatives aimed at 
reaching agreement on the issue, the most substantial of which resulted in the 2014 Stormont House 
Agreement. Failure to reach a compromise – primarily between the two largest parties, the DUP and 
Sinn Féin – brought the power sharing institutions at Stormont to the brink of collapse on numerous 
occasions. As a result, the issue of welfare reform and the parties differing stances on how best to 
proceed has been a consistent and dominant feature of political news coverage since 2012. 
  
Liberal-Conservative 
In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan’s materialist owners versus workers cleavage, Inglehart (1977, 1990) 
has highlighted the emergence of what he terms post-materialist values amongst the younger 
generation, leading to the growth of left-libertarian lifestyle movements that championed issues such 
as the environment, women's rights, gay rights and anti-racism. Similarly authors such as Flanagan 
(1987) contrast a “new politics”, which is defined by a divide between libertarian (“new Left”) and 
authoritarian (“new Right”) values7, from the “old politics”, the focal point of which is the role of the 
state in the economy and which separates the (economic) Left from the (economic) Right. Marks et 
al. (2006) propose that the European political space is defined by two dimensions; one (economic) 
Left-Right dimension, and one “Tan/Gal” dimension. Here Tan refers to 
‘traditionalism/authority/nationalism’, while Gal refers to ‘green/alternative/libertarian’ (Marks et al. 
2006). 
                                                 
7  In the British case see Tilley (2005). 
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 On this non-economic dimension in Northern Ireland studies by Gilland Lutz and Farrington 
(2006) and Benoit and Laver (2006) showed that in terms of socio-moral issues, Sinn Féin and 
Alliance are the two most liberal parties, the UUP and SDLP occupy the middle ground, while the 
DUP is the most conservative. Regarding the measurement of citizens’ attitudes on this dimension, 
and its relationship with party preference, Mitchell and Tilley (2004) used a four item scale to measure 
moral issues (on sexuality and abortion) and found reasonable internal consistency, suggesting a fairly 
well structured attitude dimension. Focusing on the 1991-1998 period, the authors found that moral 
conservativism increasingly predicted Protestant support for the DUP rather than UUP. Garry (2009), 
using a single item measure relating to attitudes to homosexuality, did not find evidence of the liberal-
conservative distinction explaining within-bloc voting. Again, the findings are inconsistent. 
In addition to economic left-right, a liberal-conservative dimension may also be operating in 
post-2007 Northern Ireland politics. A cluster of moral issues have dominated contemporary political 
headlines in Northern Ireland (for discussion see Tonge and Evans, 2015: 128-31). The region’s 
exceptional legislative stance on abortion, compared to other constituent parts of the UK, has been a 
source of sustained public and political debate. The opening of an abortion advice clinic in Belfast in 
2012 proved especially controversial, dominating the news agenda for several months and prompting 
a series of high-profile court cases. In March 2013, the Assembly narrowly rejected a DUP and SDLP 
proposal to outlaw private abortion clinics. A further attempt by the DUP to tighten abortion law in 
Northern Ireland was defeated in June 2015. On this occasion the margin of defeat was just two votes, 
while later that same month an unsuccessful bid to challenge Northern Ireland’s exemption from the 
1967 Abortion Act was launched at Belfast’s High Court.  
Recent years have also witnessed a notable degree of attention centred on the issue of equality 
for the LGBT community in Northern Ireland and, on a related note, the protection of religious rights. 
A decision by a DUP Health Minister in 2011 to maintain a ban on gay men donating 
blood―irrespective of its lifting in the rest of the UK―provoked much public debate and political 
rancor. An even bigger furore, however, has surrounded the issue of same-sex marriage in Northern 
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Ireland. The refusal of a baking company in 2014 to provide a customer with a product bearing a 
message supporting same-sex marriage, on account of the owner’s religious faith, has captured both 
public and political attention to a considerable degree. In response to the bakery owners being taken 
to court on grounds of discrimination, the DUP has sought to introduce a ‘conscience clause’ 
protecting business owners – a move which has been met with overwhelming opposition from other 
parties and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. In a political environment dominated by 
this colloquially dubbed ‘gay cake’ row, the DUP’s Jim Wells was forced to resign as Health Minister 
following controversial remarks about the suitability of homosexuals to foster children. Again, this 
episode, which occurred on the Westminster campaign trail, generated extensive media and political 
scrutiny.  
 
EU  
In addition to the economic left-right and the liberal-conservative divides, we also focus on the pro- 
versus anti-EU issue dimension which is of considerable salience across Europe and particularly in 
the UK in the context the referendum on UK membership of the EU. The EU debate may be linked 
to a more profound divide within society. For example, Kriesi et al. (2006) identify a recent societal 
cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of globalization, arguing that “losers” tend to take a position 
of cultural demarcation by rejecting immigration and European integration. In a similar vein, Ford 
and Goodwin (2014) claim that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which garnered 
12.6 percent in the 2015 UK general election, draws its support primarily from what they describe as 
“left behind” sectors of society, typically older, male blue-collar workers who have become victims 
of economic globalisation. Referring also to the recent growth of UKIP, some UK commentators have 
proposed a corresponding divide between “communitarians” and “cosmopolitans”. The former (the 
group to which most UKIP supporters belong) are wary of change, prefer continuity and stability and 
feel that “those close to us matter more than people who are far away” (Goodhart, 2014), while the 
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latter are mainly metropolitan liberals who embrace change, cultural diversity and geographical 
mobility.  
The issue of the EU has long been a core element of intra- and inter-party debate in Britain, 
and has also been studied in the specific Northern Ireland context. The Gilland Lutz and Farrington 
(2006) and Benoit and Laver (2006) studies found that the DUP is the most stridently euro-sceptic of 
the parties, followed by the UUP and Sinn Féin. The SDLP and Alliance are both pro-EU, with the 
former party the most extreme in their position. As far as citizens’ attitudes and vote choice are 
concerned, Garry (2012) found at the 2009 European Parliament election that in the nationalist bloc 
Sinn Féin voters were more sceptical than SDLP voters (although there were no such distinctions 
between the DUP and UUP support bases). 
 
Specific research questions 
 Our specific research questions that we now address are: 
1. In addition to the ethno-national dimension, is there any other strong attitudinal dimension - 
such as economic left-right, liberal-conservative or pro- versus anti-EU - that structures 
citizens’ political attitudes? 
2. If there is, do the parties offer a distinct choice on this additional dimension? 
3. If there is and parties do offer a distinct choice on this additional attitude dimension, does this 
attitude dimension determine vote choice? 
The parties we consider are those that are significant insofar as they garnered at least five percent of 
the vote in both the 2011 elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and in the 2015 UK general 
election. This leaves us with five parties: the DUP, Sinn Féin, the SDLP, the UUP and the Alliance. 
 
4. Data 
We generate data on citizens’ attitudes from a Voter Advice Application (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) that 
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we developed and applied in Northern Ireland in the run up to the 2015 Westminster election.8 VAAs 
are online applications that enable their users to compare their policy preferences with those of 
political parties or election candidates in order to help them decide how to vote (for an overview of 
VAAs, see Garzia and Marschall (2012)). Users are presented with a number of issue statements to 
which they can express varying degrees of agreement or disagreement. Parties and candidates are also 
assigned positions with respect to each issue statement and the VAA matches users with the 
parties/candidates, generating a visual display (typically a map or bar chart) for users to visualise their 
proximity with each party or candidate. WhoGetsMyVoteUK included thirty issue statements 
(provided in the Appendix), which were selected according to the following criteria: (1) statements 
reflected contentious issues in Northern Ireland that had recently (in the previous two years or so) 
received attention in the media; (2) parties took clear positions with regard to each issue with some 
parties adopting a favourable position and others a contrary position; (3) evidence suggested that 
voters were similarly split on each issue; (4) issues were chosen to be as varied as possible and to 
cover most if not all relevant political debates at both national and regional (Northern Ireland) level. 
In WhoGetsMyVoteUK, there were five items relating to taxation and spending, two on education, 
one on healthcare, one on criminal justice, one on housing, one on the environment, five on foreign 
policy/EU affairs, three on immigration, five on inter-communal relations and six on miscellaneous 
social issues. For more on statement selection and formulation, see the online appendix.  For each 
item VAA users were presented with six possible answer categories: “completely agree”, “agree”, 
“neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”, “completely disagree” and “no opinion”.9 In the subsequent 
analysis all responses were given equal weight, the first five categories were considered to represent 
                                                 
8  Our analysis is hence a single case study at a particular point in time. Absence of directly comparable data means 
an over-time longtitudinal analysis is not possible. As described earlier, Northern Ireland is an exemplary case of 
post violent conflict consociational power-sharing and hence we focus on this single case rather than engaging in 
comparative analysis. 
9 “Neither agree nor disagree” and “no opinion” were provided as separate response categories with the former 
response located between “agree and disagree” in the visual display, and the latter placed separately, below the 
other five responses. This is because “no opinion” was intended to indicate a lack of interest or knowledge of the 
issue, while “neither agree nor disagree” was intended to represent a middle position. Psychological research into 
the behaviour of VAA users suggests that users do indeed evaluate these two response categories as separate (Baka 
et al., 2012). 
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an ordinal scale, while “no opinion” responses were considered as missing values. Users were also 
given the option of answering a number of supplementary questions, relating to age, gender, 
education, party affiliation and vote intention.10 Eighty-five percent of users completed all the 
supplementary questions and, possibly counter-intuitively, many expressed a clear vote intention and 
party affiliation, suggesting that―rather than using the tool as advice as to how to vote―some users 
completed the VAA out of interest or to check if the application would confirm their already-made 
decisions. It should be noted that all the data we use here from the VAA were collected prior to the 
respondent (VAA user) being given any information regarding where parties stand or where the 
respondent stands on any generated scale. Before analysis the data were cleaned thoroughly to weed 
out as many “rogue” entries as possible (for cleaning methodology, see the online Appendix). After 
extensive cleaning of data, the dataset included 6,636 entries (individuals), compared to 9,256 entries 
prior to cleaning, meaning that 28.3% of users were excluded in the cleaning process.  
 Parties' official positions on each of the 30 issue statements were determined by the Delphi 
method (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963; Gemenis, 2015). First, a panel of experts were assigned to 
independently code all parties on all issue statements. Coders justified each one of their estimates by 
providing information from statements in policy documents, party manifestos or other relevant 
sources. Five coders were assigned to code each party. Subsequently, each of the coders’ individual 
estimates of each party on each item, and each coder’s associated justification of each estimate, were 
fed back to the panel anonymously for a second round of coding in which panelists updated their 
initial codes with the help of justifications from their fellow coders. Once the codes converged to a 
sufficient extent to be deemed consistent (demonstrated by values of van der Eijk's (2001) measure 
of agreement A>0.7), the median response was taken as the final estimate. Only two rounds of coding 
were needed. 
 For our analysis we rely on both user-generated data and expert coding. We first identify latent 
ideological dimensions from user responses to the thirty issue statements. Following Gerbing and 
                                                 
10 For the party affiliation and vote intention questions, the options “none” and “undecided” were available. 
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Anderson (1988), we first apply exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to the user response data to get a 
rough idea of what latent dimensions are relevant, then apply confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
evaluate and, if necessary, refine the factors identified by EFA (for further details, see the online 
appendix). In doing so, we adopt a “bottom-up” perspective that assumes that the dimensionality of 
the political space is fundamentally “demand-generated”, or determined by the orientations of voters. 
We predetermine neither the number of dimensions nor the nature of each dimension. This “bottom-
up” approach contrasts with the more common practice of defining ideological dimensions a priori 
(see, for example, Marks et al., 2006), but we deem it more appropriate given our emphasis on societal 
cleavages. Having identified latent dimensions, we then plot a) the position and spread of party 
supporters (from user-generated data) and b) the party positions as determined by the expert coders 
with respect to these dimensions. 
 Regarding the quality of the data, the following points may be made. In terms of the expert 
coding to generate party positions, our data is arguably of very high quality. Five coders were used 
compared to a single coder that is used in the Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001). The interactive, 
multi-round nature of the Delphi process also compares favourably with the methodology used by 
Chapel Hill (Bakker et al., 2015), in which a large number of coders code parties, but discrepancies 
between coders are resolved by simply taking the mean values.   
In terms of our data on citizen opinion, which is perhaps more fundamental insofar as it 
determines the ideological dimensions we work with, we face a number of challenges. First, it could 
be argued that the items used in the VAA are determined by the questionnaire designers' 
preconceptions of what are the fundamental ideological dimensions and that therefore the dimensions 
that are “discovered” merely reflect this latent bias. While we cannot remove bias in the question 
formulation process entirely, we carry out a robustness test by repeating our analysis on a similar 
dataset that was generated by another VAA deployed in Northern Ireland just a year earlier. This was 
the EUvox VAA that was deployed in all twenty-eight EU member states prior to the 2014 elections 
to the European Parliament (EP). This VAA also included thirty issue statements but most were very 
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different; twenty-one of them were common to all EU member states and just nine were specific to 
Northern Ireland (to see the statements, refer to the online appendix). This contrasts with 
WhoGetsMyVoteUK in which all statements were designed to reflect UK/Northern Ireland issues. 
WhoGetsMyVoteUK and EUvox shared just eight common items. If we were able to obtain similar 
results from these two very different sets of issue statements it would confirm the robustness of our 
findings. After cleaning, the dataset generated by EUvox included 2,172 entries. 
The second challenge is that our sample is not representative; rather the respondents are self-
selected. This leads to problems in terms of generalizing from our sample given that respondents are 
unlike the population as a whole in many respects. Typically, VAA respondents tend to have above 
average levels of interest in politics, tend to be younger and tend (somewhat) to be male (Marschall, 
2014). Perhaps even more importantly, their distribution in terms of political orientation may not 
reflect real world results, potentially leading to a skewed sample that cannot reveal the most relevant 
ideological dimensions that define the universe of voters. However, the effect of these obvious 
disadvantages can be minimized by applying a number of sampling techniques to the data. In order 
to correct for possible political bias in our sample, we generate a sample of users that is more or less 
representative of the voting population in terms of vote intention and repeat our analysis on this new 
sample. For additional robustness checks to account for bias on the other variables we divide the 
overall sample of VAA users into a number of different sub-samples, based on age, education and 
political interest, and perform the analysis on each subgroup separately. 
  
5. Results 
5.1 Attitude dimensions 
When Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is applied to citizens' responses to the survey items in 
WhoGetsMyVoteUK, the “elbow” appears to be located on the fifth eigenvalue, suggesting that there 
are four relevant dimensions in the political space. When we feed the outputs of the EFA into 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and then eliminate items until the model satisfies our goodness 
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of fit criteria11, we find that one dimension contains economic issues (tax, spending, state/private 
sector involvement in public services and the economy, fracking, university tuition fees, size of the 
public sector, redistribution of wealth and workers' rights), one cultural-moral issues (drug use, gay 
marriage, euthanasia, role of Christianity/religion), one sectarian issues (use of flags, parades, legacy 
of “the Troubles”, union with the Republic of Ireland) and one issues on Europe (desirability of 
membership, EU powers, membership of the ECHR). Table 1 (below) shows the individual items that 
load onto each dimension, as well as the goodness of fit indices. Items are identified by the number 
assigned to each item in the table in the Appendix. 
 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
 
 Looking now at the consistency of each of the dimensions identified, if the ethno-national 
sectarian divide is the dominant dimension in Northern Irish society, we would expect that the items 
that belong to this dimension form a stronger scale (in terms of internal consistency) than the items 
that load onto the other dimensions. Performing Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) on the items that load 
onto each dimension in each dataset, we see that while the Loevinger H coefficient, which measures 
the interdependence of items in a given scale, is indeed greater for the sectarian scale, the cultural-
moral scale is also quite strong (see Table 2). 
 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
 
 Specifically, the sectarian scale conforms to Mokken's “strong” category (H>.5), while the 
cultural-moral scale  is “medium” in strength (H>.4). The EU dimension is a “weak” scale (H>.3) 
that includes just three items, but one of these violates the ‘crit’ threshold for monotone homogeneity.  
                                                 
11 The goodness of fit indicators we choose are that the comparative fit index (CFI) should be at least 0.95, the Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI) at least 0.94 and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) equal to or below 0.08. 
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(For more on the criteria used in Mokken Scale Analysis, see the online appendix). The economic 
dimension is the weakest and does not even reach Mokken's minimum level of acceptability (H<.3). 
Overall, therefore, on the demand side (i.e. from the side of citizens that use the VAA), it would seem 
that the sectarian dimension is not the only relevant one. In particular, the cultural-moral dimension 
represents a major divide within Northern Irish society and the economic and Europe dimensions also 
have some (albeit less) discriminatory power. 
 Unfortunately, however, our sample is subject to quite a strong political bias. Out of 3,059 
users who expressed a clear vote intention, 1,140 intended to vote for the Alliance Party (fifth-placed 
in terms of votes in the 2015 elections), while just 324 intended to vote for the first-placed party, the 
DUP (see Table 3). To control for this we generate a new sample that includes all 324 DUP voters, 
310 SF voters, 180 UUP voters, 176 SDLP voters, 108 Alliance voters, 32 UKIP (United Kingdom 
Independence Party) voters, 29 TUV (Traditional Unionist Voice) voters and 82 voters of other parties 
or independents. We generate this sample by randomly selecting entries from each group of voters. 
The new sample reflects the population as a whole in terms of how real votes were cast in 2015 and 
is augmented by a further 934 VAA users who declared either that they did not intend to vote or were 
undecided (in order to represent the 43% of voters who did not vote). Applying the above analysis to 
the new sample, the exact same dimensional structure emerges with precisely the same items loading 
onto each dimension. The goodness-of-fit indices in Table 1 show that this structure fits even better 
with the new sample than with the original one, and Mokken Scale Analysis (Table 2) produces 
similar, or improved values for Loevinger's H (with the moral-cultural scale becoming “strong”). This 
suggests that the model is really quite robust and the lack of representativeness of our sample may 
not pose as much of a problem as we foresaw. 
 
<< Table 3 about here >> 
 
 Table 3 suggests that our dataset is also biased in favour of young, well-educated and 
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politically interested voters. For additional robustness checks to estimate the effects of these biases, 
we re-apply our analysis on the following samples: a) users who do not pay a high degree of attention 
to politics12; b) users who did not continue their education beyond the age of 19 and c) users of thirty-
five years of age or more. These samples are designed to counteract the prevailing sample bias. For 
samples b) and c) the dimensions extracted are identical to those extracted from the full sample and 
the goodness-of-fit indices remain acceptable, while for sample a) we need to remove one item from 
the economic scale and one item from the sectarian for the model to satisfy our goodness of fit criteria. 
However the other two scales remain identical and the four-dimensional model remains valid. That 
the model still applies when our sample is skewed to make it biased in the opposite manner to the 
overall sample is testimony to its robustness. The outputs of these analyses are available in the online 
appendix. 
 Our final robustness test is designed to control for statement selection bias. Identifying latent 
dimensions from the (second) dataset derived from the EUvox VAA reveals an almost identical four-
dimensional structure with “strong” (H>0.5) sectarian and cultural-moral dimensions, a small (two-
item) EU dimension and an economic dimension that is “weak” (H>0.3), but still more coherent than 
the equivalent dimension derived from the WhoGetsMyVoteUK dataset. Details of the dimensions 
derived from the EUvox dataset and the items that load onto them, as well as the outputs from EFA, 
CFA and Mokken Scale Analysis, are provided in the online appendix.  
 
5.2 Where do the parties stand? 
Our next task is to see whether Northern Ireland’s political parties can be distinguished by their 
positions on issues relating to the four dimensions we have identified. We consider both the positions 
of the parties as coded by experts and the positions of those users who self-identified as party 
supporters. We would expect these positions to be broadly similar, but given the fact that official party 
                                                 
12 To the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how much attention do you generally pay to politics?”, these users 
positioned themselves from 0 to 6. 
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programmes need to be consistent, while voters (including party supporters)  are often idiosyncratic 
in their views, we would also expect the parties as coded by elites to have clearer (i.e. more polarised) 
positions than their supporters. 
 To define the position of a party or user with respect to a given dimension, we use their 
positions on those items that we identified above as “belonging” to that dimension by virtue of 
satisfying the goodness-of-fit criteria when CFA is applied and construct a score of between zero and 
one for each dimension. Details of how this is done is provided in the online appendix. We drop one 
item (Item 17) from the Europe dimension as it appears only to load onto this dimension weakly and 
violates the monotone homogeneity model (see above).  
 Table 4 shows the positions of each party (as coded by experts) with respect to each dimension. 
A value close to 1 represents an economic right-wing, cultural conservative, nationalist and pro-
European perspective on the respective dimensions. 
 
<< Table 4 about here >> 
 
 Overall, Table 4 appears to show (i) that the DUP, followed by the UUP, takes the most right-
wing position economically, while Sinn Féin takes the furthest left position, (ii) that on the cultural-
moral dimension the Alliance, followed by Sinn Féin, take the most socially liberal position while the 
DUP takes the most socially conservative position, (iii) that (unsurprisingly) Sinn Féin takes the most 
nationalist position, while the DUP and UUP take the most unionist position, (iv) that the SDLP and 
Alliance are the most pro-European parties, while the DUP is the most euro-sceptic. 
 To augment this analysis we also consider the positions of those VAA users who can be 
described as “party supporters”. These we define as users who a) say they feel closest to a particular 
party and b) said that they would vote for the same party in the forthcoming elections. Of these, we 
identified 499 Sinn Féin supporters, 225 DUP supporters, 289 SDLP supporters, 173 UUP supporters 
and 907 Alliance supporters. The mean positions of each group of party supporters with respect to all 
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four dimensions is shown in Table 5 (below). 
 
<< Table 5 about here >> 
 
 Figure 1 (below) displays these positions graphically, but considers only the two dimensions 
that polarise the parties most: the cultural-moral dimension and the sectarian dimension. The plots 
display the means of each group of party supporters with respect to these two dimensions (with a 
square), each party's position according to the expert coding (with an asterisk) and the contour lines 
that enclose 50 percent of party supporters.13 We can see that, as is the case with the party positions 
from expert coding, Alliance and SF supporters are located on the liberal side of the cultural-moral 
spectrum, while DUP supporters are furthest towards the conservative pole. Similarly DUP supporters 
and SF supporters are at opposite sides of the sectarian scale. As expected, the official party positions 
as coded by experts appear more polarised than party supporters, given the need of parties to be 
consistent. Sinn Féin and the SDLP appear to buck this trend somewhat, insofar as their supporters 
appear somewhat more “liberal” than the party position. However, older voters of these two long-
established parties may be more conservative that younger supporters, who are more likely to use the 
VAA. 
 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
 
5.3 Voting behaviour 
So far we have demonstrated that, in addition to the ethno-national dimension, the moral liberal-
conservative theme is a strong attitude dimension when data from citizens (the demand side) is 
examined and parties (the supply side) do offer clear positions on this dimension. Do voters, in 
                                                 
13 Density maps are generated in such a way that each contour line encloses areas in which the density of users is greater 
than outside. The 50 per cent contour line is identified using the Two-Dimensional Kernel Density Estimation function 
in the R-package MASS (Venables and Ripley, 2012). 
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addition to ethno-national factors, actually vote on the basis of the moral dimension? We examine the 
vote choice of the two community blocs separately. First, we examine Protestant vote choice between 
the two main unionist parties (DUP and UUP) and the bi-communal Alliance party. The identification 
of Protestant and Catholic voters was made possible by the inclusion in the VAA of a supplementary 
question that asked for users' community backgrounds. 
 
<< Table 6 about here >> 
 
 A multinomial logistic regression of Protestant respondents’ vote intention between the DUP, 
UUP and Alliance is reported in Table 6, while a similar regression of Catholic respondents' vote 
intention (between Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Alliance) is shown in Table 7. Our three value dimensions 
are predictors and we control for the ethno-national dimension, age, gender and interest in politics. 
We also control for reported voting behavior at the previous Westminster election (in 2010), enabling 
our model to identify whether increased salience of economic and moral matters since 2010 
influences vote intention in 2015. 
 
<< Table 7 about here >> 
 
 We do not find that economic left-right attitudes predict vote choice in either community.14 
However, we find that liberal-conservative attitudes predict vote choice for both communities to a 
statistically significant extent (p<0.001). Using the DUP as a reference category for Protestant voters, 
we see that a move away from the conservative pole first predicts UUP support and then (as we move 
towards the liberal pole) Alliance support. For Catholic voters if we use Sinn Féin as a reference 
category, a move towards the liberal pole predicts a vote for Alliance, while a move towards the 
                                                 
14  While the absence of a left-right effect may seem remarkable from a comparative perspective, as described in 
review of the Northern Ireland literature earlier it is not so surprising. 
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conservative poll predicts an SDLP vote. The Europe dimension has predictive power only amongst 
Protestant voters with a euro-enthusiast position predicting an Alliance vote (p<0.01). 
 
Conclusion 
Institutional responses to violent conflict may start from a simple departure point that similarity 
between humans is desirable or difference is to be celebrated. Accordingly, responses may facilitate 
homogeneity or heterogeneity: encourage assimilation or break-up. Accommodationist strategies are 
towards the recognition of difference end of the response spectrum and consociational power sharing 
is one influential option in the post-conflict democratic designer's toolkit (see discussion in O’Leary 
2013). While critics bemoan its recognition of the underlying divide upon which conflict was based, 
proponents would highlight the system as necessary to provide group-based safeguards at the same 
time as ending violence. Proponents would also downplay the likelihood of the system cementing a 
divide-based dimension of competition while critics are more wary. It is the role of empirical analysis 
to help identify whether or not multi-dimensional politics operates in the context of power sharing.  
 We set up a fairly challenging set of criteria for the observation of multi-dimensional politics. 
From the demand side a dimension must exhibit strong internal coherence as evidenced in the inter-
correlation of citizens' responses to survey items related to a particular theme and the dimension must 
be demonstrably distinct from the dimension associated with the underlying divide. From the supply 
side, parties must offer distinct positions as measured by a set of expert coders using published party 
statements on the same issues that cluster for citizens on that theme. Third, regarding the interplay of 
supply and demand there must be evidence of citizens' vote choice being determined by the issue 
area, controlling for the underlying divide and previous vote choice.  
 From the Northern Ireland example the moral liberal-conservative divide meets these quite 
demanding criteria.  This suggests that there is scope for multi-dimensional politics to operate under 
power sharing conditions. Ethno-national disputes still bedevil Northern Ireland politics and 'legacy' 
issues associated with flags, parading and the past are far from being resolved. But this continuing 
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political disagreement over issues associated with the nationalist-unionist divide may co-exist with 
other issue areas. This is not to say that members of one community are 'crossing the divide' and 
voting for parties from the rival community but within-bloc and outside-bloc voting is driven by the 
moral dimension and the dimension is strongly coherent. Indeed, events since the 2015 Westminster 
election suggest that the cultural-moral dimension – and the issue of gay rights in particular – will 
remain salient for both citizens and parties (posing the challenge of how parties deal in the future with 
this ‘second dimension’ of competition (Elias et al., 2015)). On 2 November 2015 the Assembly voted 
narrowly in favour of same-sex marriage. The motion was, however, controversially vetoed by the 
DUP.  Subsequent comments by UUP leader Mike Nesbitt on the issue also suggest a potential 
liberalising of his party’s stance, which would create greater distinction within the unionist bloc 
(BBC, 26 October 2015).  So, the implications of this analysis for normative debates about whether 
or not consociation is a good institutional response to violent conflict is that, at least in the exemplary 
Northern Ireland case, there is current evidence that a non-ethnonational dimension of competition is 
observable and hence the concerns of critics that the institutions cement the ethno-national divide 
seem to be overplayed.   
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Appendix: Issue Statements in the WhoGetsMyVoteUK VAA 
 
Item 
no. 
Item 
1 Government spending should be cut further in order to balance the budget. 
2 A “mansion tax” should be levied on high-value residential properties. 
3 Inheritance tax should be abolished. 
4 The top rate of income tax should be reduced. 
5 Stormont should block the introduction of what is commonly known as the “bedroom tax” on under-
occupied social homes. 
6 Private sector involvement in the NHS should be reduced. 
7 The government should allow the extraction of underground shale gas (fracking). 
8 The option of imprisonment should be retained for the possession of drugs, including for personal 
consumption. 
9 Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion. 
10 Same sex and heterosexual couples should enjoy the same rights to marry. 
11 Doctors should be allowed to help terminally ill patients to die if they so wish. 
12 Northern Ireland should be more confident about its Christian heritage. 
13 For social housing, priority should be given to people whose parents and grandparents were born 
locally. 
14 Post-primary schools in Northern Ireland should be able to select pupils according to ability. 
15 University tuition fees should be scrapped. 
16 The UK should remain within the European Union. 
17 A single EU member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other member states 
agree to it. 
18 The UK should take a tougher line over Russian involvement in Ukraine. 
19 The UK should maintain its support to developing countries through foreign aid. 
20 The UK should be able to restrict the number of EU immigrants entering the country. 
21 The UK should welcome a larger number of asylum seekers from war-torn countries. 
22 State benefits should only be available to those who have lived in the UK for at least five years. 
23 Young people should be given the right to vote at the age of 16. 
24 The UK should withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights. 
25 Northern Ireland should become part of a United Ireland. 
26 The IRA’s violent campaign during the Troubles was totally unacceptable and always wrong. 
27 There should be strict limits on the number of days the Union flag can be flown on public buildings. 
28 Parades should only be allowed after talks between marchers and residents. 
29 Those convicted of Troubles-related terrorist offences should be regarded as ‘victims’ of the conflict. 
30 Businesses should be allowed to refuse custom to those who hold views contrary to their religious 
faith. 
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Table 1: Dimensionality of the Policy Space: Items and Goodness of Fit Indices 
  
 
Re-sampled dataset 
(n=2,175) 
Economic 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15 
Cultural/Moral 8, 10, 11, 12, 30 8, 10, 11, 12, 30 
Sectarian 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 
Europe 16, 17, 24 16, 17, 24 
Goodness of fit indices CFI=0.952, TLI=0.945, 
RMSEA=0.060 
CFI=0.961, TLI=0.955, 
RMSEA=0.062 
Note: Goodness of fit indices include the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) at the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA). 
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Table 2: Mokken Scale Analysis Applied to the Four Policy Dimensions 
Dataset Dimension Loevinger’s H No. crits ≥ 80 
 
 
Full dataset (n=6,636) 
Economic 0.258 0 
Cultural-Moral 0.485 0 
Sectarian 0.563 0 
Europe 0.339 1 
 
 
Re-sampled dataset  
(n=2,175) 
Economic 0.247 0 
Cultural-Moral 0.508 0 
Sectarian 0.619 0 
Europe 0.339 0 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the Sample 
Sample Number of Users 
Total 6,636 
DUP Voters 324 
SF Voters 601 
UUP Voters 253 
SDLP Voters 389 
Alliance Voters 1,140 
Attention to Politics: 0-6 3,024 
Attention to Politics: 7-10 3,101 
Educated to Age 19 or less 1,504 
Educated to Age 20 or more 3,422 
Still in education 1,419 
Aged less than 35 4,276 
Aged 35 or more 2,086 
Note: The sums of the categories do not add up to the total number as some users withheld information. 
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Table 4: Party Positions by Dimension (Expert Coding) 
Party Economic Cultural-Moral Sectarian European 
DUP 0.536 1.000 0.050 0.625 
SF 0.179 0.300 1.000 0.875 
SDLP 0.214 0.450 0.600 1.000 
UUP 0.464 0.600 0.050 0.750 
Alliance 0.286 0.200 0.550 1.000 
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Table 5: Party Positions of Party Supporters by Dimension 
Party Economic Cultural-Moral Sectarian European 
DUP 0.559 0.664 0.171 0.561 
SF 0.323 0.243 0.818 0.843 
SDLP 0.381 0.338 0.615 0.842 
UUP 0.579 0.536 0.203 0.630 
Alliance 0.436 0.254 0.462 0.833 
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Table 6: Multinomial logistic regression predicting Protestant vote: (DUP=Reference 
Category) 
 
     UUP     Alliance 
    B  SE   B  SE  
   
economic left (0-1)   -1.399  .777   -.931  .881   
     
moral conservative (0-1) -1.486** .527   -5.184*** .624 
           
Eurosceptic (0-1)  -.651  .516   -1.989** .648 
 
 
Controls 
 
nationalist-unionist (0-1) -2.734** .960   -9.399*** 1.153 
 
attention to politics (0-1) .132  .496   .211  .569 
 
age    .023*  .010   .021  .011 
 
female    .464  .261   .597*  .294 
 
Vote Behaviour 2010 
(DUP=Ref category) 
UUP    -2.793*** .377   -1.780*** .462 
Alliance   -1.093* .511   -3.264*** .449 
Other party   -1.813*** .424   -1.518** .524 
Did not vote   -.969*  .415   -1.327** .430 
Other response  -1.613*** .354   -.666  .444 
 
   
     
intercept   10.251** 1.420   17.361*** 1.673  
     
 
n=1073 
cox and snell psuedo r-square=.61 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Note: the differences between the UUP and Alliance on morality are statistically significant at .001 
and on EU at .03 
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Table 7: Multinomial logistic regression predicting Catholic vote: (Sinn Féin=Reference 
Category) 
 
 
     SDLP     Alliance 
    B  SE   B  SE  
   
economic left (0-1)   .016  .762   -1.177  .777  
     
moral conservative (0-1) 2.306*** .715   -2.980*** .847 
           
Eurosceptic (0-1)  -1.283  .741   -.274  .720 
 
 
Controls 
 
nationalist-unionist (0-1) 7.387*** .898   9.293*** .964 
 
attention to politics (0-1) 1.178*  .506   1.515** .536 
 
age    -.005  .012   .038*** .012 
 
female    .718*** .255   .616*  .264   
 
Vote Behaviour 2010 
(DUP=Ref category) 
SDLP    -3.596*** .337   -1.543*** .366  
Alliance   -.740  .754   -3.683*** .487 
Other party   -1.631** .589   -1.461** .564 
Did not vote   -1.570*** .379   -1.419*** .365 
Other response  -1.688*** .384   -1.368*** .399 
 
   
     
intercept   3.542*  1.612   4.474** 1.478 
     
 
n=1128 
cox and snell psuedo r-square=.61 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Note: the difference between SDLP and Alliance on morality is statistically significantly different at 
.001. 
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Figure 1: Party Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
